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Faculty of Economics and Sociology, Department of Statistical Methods,
University of Lodz, 41/43 Rewolucji 1905 St., 90-214 Lodz, Poland.
Abstract
The explicit construction is presented of two-player game satisfying: (i)
symmetry with respect to the permutation of the players; (ii) the existence of
upper bound on total payoff following from Bell inequality; (iii) the existence
of unfair equilibrium with total payoff saturating the above bound. The
quantum counterpart of the game is considered which possesses only fair
equilibria and strategies outperforming the classical ones.
I Introduction
Probably the most striking feature of quantum theory is nonlocality, i.e. the ex-
istence of correlations which are not admissible in local theory. The correlations
which are admitted by a local theory must satisfy a set of inequalities (Bell inequal-
ities) which can be violated by quantum mechanical correlations [1]. The violation
of Bell inequalities has been confirmed experimentally [2].
Nonlocality, expressed in terms of violation of Bell inequalities, is inherent to
quantum theory and appears to be useful in practice (see [3] and the references
contained therein).
Bell inequalities can be also discussed in the context of game theory. In partic-
ular, in order to relate the nonlocality to the advantages of the strategies based on
quantum correlations, a quantum version of the game with incomplete information
[4] has been proposed [5] and further developed in a number of papers [6], [7], [8],
1kbolonek@uni.lodz.pl
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[9]. Recently, Brunner and Linden [10] considered more general setting for quantum
Bayesian games where nonlocal resources provide an advantage over any classical
strategy. The examples of games presented in Ref. [10] are the games of common
interest. On the other hand, Pappa et al. [11] considered a particular example of
two-player conflicting interest game where quantum mechanics also offers an ad-
vantage over the classical strategies. The game they considered is a combination
of the Battle of Sexes and CHSH games. Further examples of conflicting interest
games where quantum mechanics offers an advantage have been given by Situ [12].
Roy et al. [13], by a slight modification of the utility functions proposed in [11],
constructed the examples of games where quantum strategies can outperform the
unfair classical equilibrium ones.
The notion of quantum conflicting interest games can be extended to the multi-
player case. The existence of various forms of entanglement in multipartite systems
makes the problem of the relation between nonlocality and the advantage coming
from quantum strategies more complicated. For example, Situ et al. [14] con-
structed an example of Bayesian three-player game based on Svetlichny inequality
[15]. In this case the advantages of the quantum game are based on the correlations
that can be reduced to the mixtures of two-player quantum ones related locally to
the third player.
An example of conflicting interest three-player game based on Bell inequalities
has been given by the author [16]. In that paper the scheme for constructing such
games was outlined. However, the general formulae for three-player case are quite
complicated. On the other hand, the two-player case can be described more explic-
itly. It is the aim of the present paper to provide such description which generalizes
the particular example considered by Pappa et al. [11].
We shall follow the notion of conflicting interest game used by Pappa et al. [11]
(cf. also [23]) which is defined in terms of Nash equilibria. Consider a game played
by two players, A and B, possessing at least two Nash equilibria such that the
corresponding payoffs obey F
(I)
A > F
(I)
B and F
(II)
A < F
(II)
B . Moreover, let us assume
that for any fair equilibrium, F
(f)
A = F
(f)
B (if it exists), F
(f)
A < F
(I)
A and F
(f)
B < F
(II)
B .
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Then each player prefers a different equilibrium. In this sense (cf. Refs. [11] and
[23]) we are speaking about a conflicting interest game.
We are interested in the advantages over classical strategies offered by quantum
mechanics. In particular, we study in more general setting the question raised in
Ref. [11]: can the genuinely quantum strategies convert the conflicting interest
game into the common interest one.
A particularly interesting situation arises when the initial game is symmetric
with respect to the permutation of the players. Then the occurrence of unfair
equilibria breaks this symmetry. This situation resembles the phenomenon of spon-
taneous symmetry breaking which plays an important role in statistical physics and
quantum field theory. There the dynamics (i.e. the Hamiltonian) is invariant un-
der the action of some symmetry group while the ground/equilibrium state breaks
this symmetry. It can also happen that a symmetry broken at the classical level is
restored when quantum effects are taken into account. The simplest example is the
onedimensional double well which is parity invariant but the classical equilibrium
(ground) states break parity. The quantum mechanical tunelling between both wells
restores symmetry. We shall see that something similar happens here. This analogy
is, obviously, quite far but still interesting and nice.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II is devoted to the construction
of general game with incomplete information and conflicting interest. Its quantum
counterpart is considered in Sec. III. Finally, some conclusions are described in the
last section. The more technical details are relegated to the Appendices.
II Two-player Bayesian games with conflicting in-
terest
We consider the following situation. There are two players, Alice (A) and Bob
(B) and each player can acquire a type xi, i ∈ {A,B}, xi ∈ {0, 1}, according to
the probability distribution P (x) ≡ P (xA, xB). They decide on their actions yi,
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yi ∈ {0, 1}, according to a chosen strategy. The expected payoff of each player
reads
Fi =
∑
(x,y)
P (x)p(y|x)ui(x, y) (1)
with p
(
y|x) ≡ p (yA, yB|xA, xB) being the probability the players choose actions
y ≡ (yA, yB) given their types were x ≡ (xA, xB); ui
(
x, y
)
are the utility functions
determining the gains of players depending on their types and actions.
Let us discuss the general constraints imposed on the formula (1). The notions
of fair and unfair equilibria are set in a proper framework if we assume that our
game is symmetric with respect to the permutation of the players. As a result we
have the following symmetry relations:
uA (xA, xB, yA, yB) = uB (xB, xA, yB, yA) . (2)
What concerns the probabilities we assume that they obey the no-signalling condi-
tions ∑
yB
p (yA, yB|xA, xB) =
∑
yB
p (yA, yB|xA, x′B)
∑
yA
p (yA, yB|xA, xB) =
∑
yA
p (yA, yB|x′A, xB)
(3)
together with the normalization ones
∑
y
p
(
y|x) = 1 for all x. (4)
With the above conditions we consider two types of probability distributions:
(i) the classical ones: one assumes further constraints in the form of Bell in-
equalities [17]. In order to write out these constraints in terms of probabilities
p
(
y|x) entering the payoffs (1) we ascribe two pairs of observables, Ax, Bx,
x ∈ {0, 1}, to the players A and B, respectively. They are indexed by the
players types and can acquire two values, Ax = ±1, Bx = ±1. In terms of
expectation values of these observables the Bell inequality reads [17]
|〈A0B0〉+ 〈A1B0〉+ 〈A0B1〉 − 〈A1B1〉| ≤ 2. (5)
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By defining the relevant probabilities as
p (yA, yB|xA, xB) = p (AxA = 2yA − 1 ∧ BxB = 2yB − 1) (6)
one can rewrite (5) in the form
∣∣∣ 1∑
yA,yB=0
(2yA − 1) (2yB − 1)
(
p (yA, yB|0, 1) + p (yA, yB|1, 0)+
+ p (yA, yB|0, 0)− p (yA, yB|1, 1)
)∣∣∣ ≤ 2.
(7)
Assuming the inequality (5) (and, equivalently, (7)) together with the ones
obtained from (5) by all possible replacements 0↔ 1 of the players types one
finds, by virtue of Fine’s theorem [18]÷[21], the following representation of
relevant probabilities in terms of hidden variables λ:
p (yA, yB|xA, xB) =
∫
dλ ρ (λ) pA (yA|xA, λ) pB (yB|xB, λ) , (8)
ρ (λ) being the probability distribution of λ. Since there are only two possi-
ble actions per player it is sufficient to consider only hidden variables providing
two bits so that pA (yA|xA, λ) = pA (yA|xA, λA), pB (yB|xB, λ) = pB (yB|xB, λB).
In game-theoretic language the players receive advice from a classical source
(advisor) characterized by ρ (λ). The probability p
(
y|x) factorizes provided
the players are insensitive to the advisor suggestions, pA (yA|xA, λ) = pA (yA|xA)
etc. It is worth to notice that Fine’s theorem states also that Bell inequalities
imply the existence of joint probability distribution for all four observables Ax,
Bx which yields the probabilities p
(
y|x) as marginals. Therefore, the game
is classical in the sense that probabilities enter here in the same way as in
all classical systems where it is allowed to consider joint probability distribu-
tions for any set of observables. From this point of view the only additional
constraint imposed is that of no-signalling.
(ii) the quantum case: a quantum source/advisor is characterized by a choice of
twopartite density matrix ρ. In order to define the relevant probabilities one
chooses again two pairs of observables, Ax and Bx, x ∈ {0, 1}, which are
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hermitean operators acting in twodimensional Hilbert spaces of the players
and admit the spectral decompositions
Ax = 1 · A1x + (−1) ·A0x, 1 = A1x + A0x
Bx = 1 · B1x + (−1) · B0x, 1 = B1x +B0x
(9)
with Ayx, B
y
x being the corresponding projections. As a result we get the
following expressions for the payoffs:
Fi =
∑
x,y
P (x) Tr
(
ρ
(
AyAxA ⊗ ByBxB
))
ui
(
x, y
)
. (10)
The general form of Ax and Bx reads
Ax = ~n
A
x · ~σ, Bx = ~nBx · ~σ (11)
with ~nAx , ~n
B
x being the unit vectors, ~n
A
x =
(
sin θAx cosϕ
A
x , sin θ
A
x sinϕ
A
x , cos θ
A
x
)
and the similar formula for ~nBx . Note that in the quantum case the Bell
inequalities are, in general, violated.
(iii) the superquantum case: there exist non-signalling distributions which are not
of quantum mechanical origin [22]. We will not consider such probability
distributions.
We shall also assume that the distribution of the player types is uniform,
P (x) =
1
4
. (12)
In order to construct our game we start with the utility functions ui
(
x, y
)
defined
in Table 1.
We impose the following constraints:
a) ui
(
x, y
)
obey the symmetry conditions following from eqs. (2)
s7 = t10, s10 = t7, s2 = t3, s3 = t2,
s5 = t9, s9 = t5, s11 = t6, s6 = t11,
s12 = t8, s8 = t12, s15 = t14, s14 = t15,
s1 = t1, s4 = t4, s13 = t13, s16 = t16,
(13)
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Table 1: The utilities of players
xB = 0 xB = 1
yB = 0 yB = 1 yB = 0 yB = 1
xA = 0 yA = 0 (s1, t1) (s2, t2) (s5, t5) (s6, t6)
yA = 1 (s3, t3) (s4, t4) (s7, t7) (s8, t8)
xA = 1 yA = 0 (s9, t9) (s10, t10) (s13, t13) (s14, t14)
yA = 1 (s11, t11) (s12, t12) (s15, t15) (s16, t16)
b) the total payoff FA + FB is expressible solely in terms of the combination of
probabilities entering the Bell inequality (5). We impose this condition for the
following reasons. As it has been already mentioned the Bell inequality (5) to-
gether with the remaining three obtained by exchanging the observable indices
form necessary and sufficient conditions for the probabilities to be genuinely
classical, i.e. resulting as marginals from the joint probability distribution
for all observables. It cannot be violated on classical level. Therefore, the
total payoff is bounded from above by virtue of eq. (5) by some value F . If
there exist Nash equilibria saturating the bound they can be either fair, with
FA = FB =
1
2
F , or unfair, FA 6= FB = F − FA; in the latter case there must
exist, due to the symmetry of the game, the accompanying equilibrium with
F˜A = FB = F − FA, F˜B = FA. Assuming, for example, 2FA > F we find that
Alice favorizes the first unfair equilibrium while Bob - the second one. So if
there exists an unfair equilibrium saturating the bound for total payoff we are
dealing with conflicting interest game.
In order to find the resulting constraint on si and ti, i = 1, . . . , 16, we
express the sum FA + FB in terms of probabilities p(y, x); to this end we use
eqs. (1) and (12) together with the data entering Table 1. Then we demand
that p(y|x) enter FA+FB in the combination appearing on the left hand side
of (7) and, as a result, we find the following constraints (cf. the Appendix A
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for details):
s1 − s2 + t1 − t2 = s5 − s6 + t5 − t6
s1 − s2 + t1 − t2 = s9 − s10 + t9 − t10
s1 − s2 + t1 − t2 = s14 − s13 + t14 − t13
s4 − s1 + t4 − t1 = 0
s3 − s2 + t3 − t2 = 0
s8 − s5 + t8 − t5 = 0
s7 − s6 + t7 − t6 = 0
s12 − s9 + t12 − t9 = 0
s11 − s10 + t11 − t10 = 0
s16 − s13 + t16 − t13 = 0
s14 − s15 + t14 − t15 = 0.
(14)
Note that we could generalize the condition (b) by demanding that FA + FB
is expressible in terms of some linear combination of probabilities entering all
four Bell inequalities.
The general solution of (a) and (b) depends on the number of free parameters and
is given in Table 2.
Now, we must select some candidate for unfair Nash equilibrium, i.e. the cor-
responding set of probabilities p
(
y|x). We consider ”pure” strategies, i.e. the ones
obeying p(y|x) = 0, 1. For definiteness we take
p
(
y|x) = δyA,0 δyB ,1−xB ; (15)
where δy,x is the Kronecker delta function.
Let us stress that eq. (15) is a specific classical strategy that we impose as a
candidate for Nash equilibrium which determines the utility table (Table 2). Had
we chosen a different one it would have led to a different utility table. Obviously, the
probability distribution defined by eq. (15) obeys no-signalling and normalization
conditions, eqs. (3) and (4), respectively. It saturates the Bell inequality (7) so the
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Table 2: The utilities of players after using eqs. (13) and (14)
xB = 0
yB = 0 yB = 1
xA = 0 yA = 0 (s1, s1) (s2, s3)
yA = 1 (s3, s2) (s1, s1)
xA = 1 yA = 0 (s9, s5) (−2s1 + s2 + s3 + s5 − s7 + s9, s7)
yA = 1 (−2s1 + s2 + s3 + s5 − s6 + s9, s6) (s5 − s8 + s9, s8)
xB = 1
xA = 0 yA = 0 (s5, s9) (s6,−2s1 + s2 + s3 + s5 − s6 + s9)
yA = 1 (s7,−2s1 + s2 + s3 + s5 − s7 + s9) (s8, s5 − s8 + s9)
xA = 1 yA = 0 (s13, s13) (s14, 2s1 − s2 − s3 + 2s13 − s14)
yA = 1 (2s1 − s2 − s3 + 2s13 − s14, s14) (s13, s13)
bound on total payoff FA + FB is also saturated. It is one of 2
3 extremal points of
the convex set defined by eqs. (3) and (4). All strategies corresponding to these
extremal points are called the pure ones. Let us now impose the next constraint:
c) eq. (15) defines unfair Nash equilibrium such that the total payoff FA + FB
saturates the upper bound following from Bell inequality. In order to derive
the relevant conditions on the utility functions it is sufficient to consider only
the subset of pure strategies. In fact, any probability distribution describing
pure strategy and defining Nash equilibrium in this subset continues to de-
scribe a Nash equilibrium if also mixed strategies are admitted [23]. This is
because our payoffs are linear functions of probabilities p(y, x) so they acquire
their extrema on extremal points of the convex set defined by eqs. (7) and
(12). The existence of additional constraint in form of Bell inequalities only
strenghtens this argument. Obviously, extending the set of strategies by in-
cluding the mixed ones can produce new Nash equilibria. However, if a new
equilibrium is a fair one, the payoff of at least one player must be smaller than
that corresponding to the strategy (15) because the total payoff of the latter
saturates the bound following from Bell inequality.
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Demanding that eq. (15) defines unfair Nash equilibrium in the set of pure
strategies with total payoff saturating classical bound yields the following conditions:
s2 + s5 + s10 + s13 > s2 + s5 + s12 + s15,
s2 + s5 + s10 + s13 > s4 + s7 + s10 + s13,
s2 + s5 + s10 + s13 > s4 + s7 + s12 + s15,
t2 + t5 + t10 + t13 > t1 + t5 + t9 + t13,
t2 + t5 + t10 + t13 > t1 + t6 + t9 + t14,
t2 + t5 + t10 + t13 > t2 + t6 + t10 + t14,
s2 + s5 + s10 + s13 > t2 + t5 + t10 + t13,
s1 − s2 + t1 − t2 < 0.
(16)
They express the property that both Alice and Bob have nothing to gain by
changing unilateraly her/his strategy (while FA+FB saturates the relevant bound).
Taking into account the relations (13) and (14) we find finally
2s2 + 2s3 + s8 + s14 > 4s1 + s7 + s13,
s2 + s5 > s1 + s7,
3s2 + 2s3 + s5 + s8 + s14 > 5s1 + 2s7 + s13,
s3 + s7 > s1 + s5,
s3 + s6 + s7 + s14 > s1 + 2s5 + s13,
s6 + s14 > s5 + s13,
s2 + s5 > s1 + s7,
2s1 < s2 + s3.
(17)
Let us notice that the above conditions imply that, as it has been already
explained, we are dealing with conflicting interest game.
To conclude, we have defined a wide family of two-players symmetric games
with incomplete information and conflicting interest. The main assumption we
made is that the total payoff for unfair Nash equilibrium saturates the upper bound
following from Bell inequality; this leads automatically to the game with conflicting
interest.
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III The quantum counterpart of Bayesian game
with conflicting interest
Once the utilities ui
(
x, y
)
are known we can construct the quantum counterpart of
our game. To this end we use eq. (10). Let us first note an important new feature
which emerges on the quantum level if we are going to take advantage from the
possibility of violating the Bell inequalities. In the previous section we considered
the classical game in full generality, i.e. the probabilities p
(
y|x) were assumed to
obey no conditions except the no-signalling ones and the Bell inequalities; according
to Fine’s theorem the latter are, however, equivalent to the, natural on the classical
level, condition that there exists a joint probability distribution for all random
variables under consideration [18], [19]. Obviously, a further choice of probability
distribution ρ(λ) and the functions p (y|x, λ) would impose, according to eq. (8),
additional constraints on the players strategies. However, all consideration relied
on Bell inequalities only so there is no necessity for making further assumptions.
On the quantum level we would like to construct an advisor acting according to
the quantum rules which allow to outperform classical strategies. In other words,
we should violate Bell inequalities which constraint the effectiveness of classical
strategies. Not all quantum states lead to their violation. Therefore, we have to
select a particular state ρ of the advisor. This choice restricts the set of allowed
quantum strategies. The properties of the game depend not only on the utility
functions but also on the players strategies admitted. We shall see below that, with
the particular ρ selected, one can make the payoff functions of both players equal.
The resulting game has then only fair equilibria. The twofold role of quantum
strategies which both raise the payoffs in fair equilibria and eliminate the unfair
ones seems to be not sufficiently stressed in literature.
In order to construct the appropriate game we take
ρ = |Ψ〉 〈Ψ| (18)
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where
|Ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉) . (19)
Note that
e
iχ1
2
σ3 ⊗ e iχ22 σ3 |Ψ〉 = (−1)n |Ψ〉 (20)
provided χ1+χ2 = 2πn. The quantum strategies are characterized, according to eqs.
(11), by eight angles, (ϕ1, θ1) ≡
(
ϕA0 , θ
A
0
)
, (ϕ2, θ2) ≡
(
ϕA1 , θ
A
1
)
, (ϕ3, θ3) ≡
(
ϕB0 , θ
B
0
)
and (ϕ4, θ4) ≡
(
ϕB1 , θ
B
1
)
. By inserting eqs. (11), (12) and (19) into eq. (10) one
obtains explicit expressions for quantum payoffs. They are quite involved and will be
not written out explicitly. However, it can be checked that the Alice and Bob payoffs
coincide, FA = FB ≡ F , provided one additional simple constraint is imposed
2s1 − s2 − s3 − s5 + s6 + s7 − s8 = 0. (21)
We consider this constraint as a part of the definition of our game. Let us note that
our aim is to show that quantum strategies can outperform the classical ones and
not that they have to. The additional condition (21) is added for this purpose.
The equality FA = FB implies that in the quantum case we are dealing with fair
equilibria only. Moreover, they correspond to the maxima of the common payoff
function F or, equivalently, to the maxima of total payoff FA+FB ≡ 2F . Now, F is
a linear function of the combination of correlation functions entering the left-hand
side of Bell inequality (5). According to Tsirelson [24] the latter is bounded from
above by 2
√
2. It is well known that this bound can be saturated by considering
the observables built out of σ1 and σ2 only. Therefore, we can look for the maxima
of F (i.e. the Nash equilibria of quantum game) by imposing additional constraints
θi =
pi
2
, i = 1, . . . , 4. Then, using eqs. (13) and (14) we find (see Appendix B for
details):
F ≡ FA = FB = 1
16
[(2s1 − s2 − s3) (cos (ϕ1 + ϕ3) + cos (ϕ2 + ϕ3) +
+ cos (ϕ1 + ϕ4)− cos (ϕ2 + ϕ4)) + (2s2 + 2s3 + 4s5 + 4s9 + 4s13)]
(22)
Due to the last inequality (17), 2s1 − s2 − s3 < 0, we have to find the minimal
value of the combination of cosine functions entering the right hand side of eq.
12
(22). Now, according to eq. (20), the payoff functions (22) are invariant under the
transformations ϕ1,2 → ϕ1,2+χ1, ϕ3,4 → ϕ3,4+χ2, χ1+χ2 = 2nπ. Therefore, there
exist the whole families of maxima of F . They read
ϕ1 + ϕ2 =
π
4
+
(3n+ r + s+ 2)π
2
ϕ2 + ϕ3 = −π
4
+
(n− r + 3s+ 2)π
2
ϕ1 + ϕ4 = −π
4
+
(n + 3r − s+ 2)π
2
(23)
provided
n+ 3r − s = 4k or 4k + 1; (24)
the payoffs of both players read
FA = FB =
1
16
(
2
√
2 (s2 + s3 − 2s1) + 2 (s2 + s3) + 4 (s5 + s9 + s13)
)
(25)
while the total payoff is given by
FA + FB = 2FA =
1
8
(
2
√
2 (s2 + s3 − 2s1)
)
+
1
4
(s2 + s3 + 2s5 + 2s9 + 2s13) (26)
We conclude that the quantum counterpart of our game possesses only fair equilibria
corresponding to the payoffs (25) provided the additional constraint (21) has been
imposed. The total payoff (26) saturates the Tsirelson bound, i.e. it is a global
maximum of the total payoff function.
Let us remind that the maximal total payoff on classical level, resulting fom
Bell inequality, reads
FA + FB =
1
4
(s2 + s3 − 2s1) + 1
4
(s2 + s3 + 2s5 + 2s9 + 2s13) . (27)
Quantum strategies outperform the classical ones.
IV Conclusion
We have constructed a general classical two-player game with incomplete informa-
tion and conflicting interest. To this end we imposed the following conditions: (i)
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the game is symmetric with respect to the permutation of the players; (ii) the to-
tal payoff is expressible in terms of Bell operator; (iii) there exists an unfair Nash
equilibrium saturating the bound on total payoff resulting from Bell inequality.
Then we proposed a quantum counterpart of the game. To this end we picked
out a particular model of quantum advisor based on the pure state (19). It appeared
that, by adding one additional condition on utilities (eq. (21)), we were able to
make payoff functions equal. This implies immediately that our quantum game
possesses only fair equilibria. Moreover, the quantum strategies outperform, due to
the violation of Bell inequality, the classical ones. The quantum equilibria saturate
the Tsirelson bound; the quantum character of the game is maximally exploited.
Let us stress again that the probabilities entering the classical payoff functions
are restricted only by no-signalling condition. The quantum ones, on the other
hand, are constrained by a specific form of quantum advisor which is chosen in such
a way that the Bell inequality can be violated. This constraint on probabilities
excludes the unfair equilibria. The quantum game is no longer a conflicting interest
one. This property seems to be not stressed sufficiently in the literature.
Note that the general solution to our conditions (14), (16) and (21) spans a
ninedimensional variety. The example considered by Pappa et al. [11] corresponds
to the following particular choice of the parameters:
s1 = 0, s2 = 1, s3 =
1
2
, s4 = 0, s5 = 0, s6 = 1, s7 =
1
2
, s8 = 0,
s9 = 0, s10 = 1, s11 =
1
2
, s12 = 0, s13 =
3
4
, s14 = 0, s15 = 0, s16 =
3
4
t1 = 0, t2 =
1
2
, t3 = 1, t4 = 0, t5 = 0, t6 =
1
2
, t7 = 1, t8 = 0,
t9 = 0, t10 =
1
2
, t11 = 1, t12 = 0, t13 =
3
4
, t14 = 0, t15 = 0, t16 =
3
4
.
Appendix A Derivation of eqs. (14)
In order to derive the conditions (14) we start with eqs. (1). Using the notation
described in Table 1 we write out explicitly the expected payoffs of both players.
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For example, one obtains (note that P (x) = 1
4
, cf. eq. (12))
FA =
1
4
(s1p (00|00) + s2p(01|00) + s3p(10|00) + s4p(11|00)+
+ s5p(00|01) + s6p(01|01) + s7p(10|01) + s8p(11|01)+
+ s9p(00|10) + s10p(01|10) + s11p(10|10) + s12p(11|10)+
+s13p(00|11) + s14p(01|11) + s15p(10|11) + s16p(11|11))
(28)
and similar equation for FB with si replaced by ti, i = 1, . . . , 16.
Now, the relevant Bell inequality reads
|〈A0B0〉+ 〈A1B0〉+ 〈A0B1〉 − 〈A1B1〉| ≤ 2 (29)
where Ak (Bk) refers to Alice (Bob) observables, k = 0, 1 denotes the type and Ak
(Bk) acquire the values 1 if yA = 1 (yb = 1) or -1 if yA = 0 (yB = 0). From the very
definition of correlation function one finds (i,j=0,1):
〈AiBj〉 = p(00|ij) + p(11|ij)− p(01|ij)− p(10|ij) (30)
Eqs. (30), together with the normalization conditions
p(00|ij) + p(11|ij) + p(01|ij) + p(10|ij) = 1 (31)
allow us to express some probabilities p(y|x) in terms of relevant correlation func-
tions and the remaining probabilities which can be considered as independent ones
p(00|ij) = 1
2
(1− 2p(11|ij) + 〈AiBj〉) (32)
p(01|ij) = 1
2
(1− 2p(10|ij)− 〈AiBj〉) (33)
Inserting (32) and (33) into (28) one finds
FA =
1
4
((
s1 − s2
2
)
〈A0B0〉+
(
s5 − s6
2
)
〈A0B1〉+
(
s9 − s10
2
)
〈A1B0〉+
+
(
s13 − s14
2
)
〈A1B1〉+ (s3 − s2) p(10|00) + (s4 − s1)p(11|00)+
+ (s7 − s6)p(10|01) + (s8 − s5)p(11|01) + (s11 − s10)p(10|10)+
+ (s12 − s9)p(11|10) + (s15 − s14)p(10|11) + (s16 − s13)p(11|11)+
+
(
s1 + s2 + s5 + s6 + s9 + s10 + s13 + s14
2
)
;
(34)
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repeating the same procedure for FB and adding the resulting expression to (34)
we obtain the formula for the total payoff FA + FB. It takes the form of linear
combination of terms proportional (with coefficients depending on si’s and ti’s)
either to correlation functions 〈AiBk〉, i, k = 0, 1, or to the independent probabilities
p(10|xAxB) and p(11|xAxB) plus a free term depending on si’s and ti’s only. By
demanding that the independent probabilities do not enter the final result while the
correlation functions enter only in the combination appearing on the left hand side
of eq. (29) one finds the relations (14).
As it has been noticed in the main text one could generalize the above rea-
soning by demanding that FA + FB is expressible in terms of linear combination
of the expressions appearing on the left hand side of (29) and the remaining Bell
inequalities
|〈A1B0〉+ 〈A0B0〉+ 〈A1B1〉 − 〈A0B1〉| ≤ 2 (35)
|〈A0B1〉+ 〈A1B1〉+ 〈A0B0〉 − 〈A1B0〉| ≤ 2 (36)
|〈A1B1〉+ 〈A0B1〉+ 〈A1B0〉 − 〈A0B0〉| ≤ 2. (37)
Appendix B Derivation of eq. (22)
The observables Ax and Bx entering the quantum payoffs are given by eqs. (11).
Therefore, we get for the type ”x”:
Ax =

 cos θAx sin θAx e−iϕAx
sin θAx e
iϕAx − cos θAx

 , x = 0, 1 (38)
Bx =

 cos θBx sin θBx e−iϕBx
sin θBx e
iϕBx − cos θBx

 . (39)
As it has been explained in the main text we can restrict ourselves to the case
θ
A,B
i =
pi
2
. Even within this restricted set of observables the upper quantum bound
for Bell correlations (Tsirelson bound [24]) can be achieved. According to our
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assumption (38) and (39) reduce to
Ax =

 0 e−iϕAx
eiϕ
A
x 0

 , Bx =

 0 e−iϕBx
eiϕ
B
x 0

 . (40)
The spectral projectors for the observables (40) read
A0x =
1
2

 1 −e−iϕAx
−eiϕAx 1

 , A1x = 12

 1 e−iϕAx
eiϕ
A
x 1


B0x =
1
2

 1 −e−iϕBx
−eiϕBx 1

 , B1x = 12

 1 e−iϕBx
eiϕ
B
x 1


(41)
From eqs. (41) and (18), (19) we easily find:
Tr
(
ρ
(
AyAxA ⊗ ByBxB
))
= 〈Ψ|AyAxA ⊗ ByBxB |Ψ〉 (42)
or
Tr
(
ρ
(
AyAxA ⊗ ByBxB
))
=
1
2
(〈0|AyAxA |0〉 〈0|ByBxB |0〉+ 〈0|AyAxA |1〉 〈0|ByBxB |1〉+
+ 〈1|AyAxA |0〉 〈1|ByBxB |0〉+ 〈1|AyAxA |1〉 〈1|ByBxB |1〉
) (43)
Eqs. (41) and (43) imply
Tr
(
ρ
(
A0xA ⊗B0xB
))
=
1
4
(
1 + cos
(
ϕAxA + ϕ
B
xB
))
Tr
(
ρ
(
A0xA ⊗B1xB
))
=
1
4
(
1− cos (ϕAxA + ϕBxB))
Tr
(
ρ
(
A1xA ⊗B0xB
))
=
1
4
(
1− cos (ϕAxA + ϕBxB))
Tr
(
ρ
(
A1xA ⊗B1xB
))
=
1
4
(
1 + cos
(
ϕAxA + ϕ
B
xB
))
.
(44)
According to the convention adopted below eq. (20) we put ϕA0 ≡ ϕ1, ϕA1 ≡ ϕ2,
ϕB0 ≡ ϕ3, ϕB1 ≡ ϕ4. Eq. (10) and the Table 1 yield now the following expressions
for the payoffs
FA =
1
16
(cos(φ1 + φ3)(s1 − s2 − s3 + s4) + cos(φ1 + φ4)(s5 − s6 − s7 + s8)+
+ cos(φ2 + φ3)(s9 − s10 − s11 + s12) + cos(φ2 + φ4)(s13 − s14 − s15 + s16)+
+ s1 + s2 + s3 + s4 + s5 + s6 + s7 + s8 + s9 + s10 + s11 + s12 + s13 + s14+
+s15 + s16)
(45)
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FB =
1
16
(cos(φ1 + φ3)(t1 − t2 − t3 + t4) + cos(φ1 + φ4)(t5 − t6 − t7 + t8)+
+ cos(φ2 + φ3)(t9 − t10 − t11 + t12) + cos(φ2 + φ4)(t13 − t14 − t15 + t16)+
+ t1 + t2 + t3 + t4 + t5 + t6 + t7 + t8 + t9 + t10 + t11 + t12 + t13 + t14+
+t15 + t16)
(46)
Taking into account the relations described in Table 2 one can reduce eqs. (45) and
(46) to
FA =
1
16
[(cos(φ1 + φ3) + 2 cos(φ2 + φ3)− cos(φ2 + φ4))(2s1 − s2 − s3)+
+ (cos(φ1 + φ4)− cos(φ2 + φ3))(s5 − s6 − s7 + s8)+
+2(s2 + s3 + 2s5 + 2s9 + 2s13)]
(47)
FB =
1
16
[(cos(φ1 + φ3) + 2 cos(φ1 + φ4)− cos(φ2 + φ4))(2s1 − s2 − s3)+
+ (cos(φ2 + φ3)− cos(φ1 + φ4))(s5 − s6 − s7 + s8)+
+2(s2 + s3 + 2s5 + 2s9 + 2s13)]
(48)
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